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DEFAMATION IN THE INTERNET AGE: MISSOURI’S 
JURISDICTIONAL FIGHT BEGINS WITH  
BALDWIN V. FISCHER-SMITH 
INTRODUCTION 
“The Internet is becoming the town square for the global village of 
tomorrow.” 
  – Bill Gates, 1999.1 
For centuries, determining jurisdiction in defamation cases was easy 
because defamatory comments made in a village town square would be settled 
in the courts of that village.2  In the twentieth century, the introduction of radio 
and television and the nationalization of print media brought additional 
jurisdictional concerns to defamation cases as this new technology allowed 
easy communication across jurisdictional lines.3  Now, with the expansion of 
the Internet, worldwide communication is available to anyone with a computer 
and an Internet connection.4  Unfortunately, many bloggers and other Internet 
content providers fail to realize that “[w]hat you type today can haunt you 
tomorrow.”5 
While Internet users may view cyberspace as a new province independent 
of real-world concerns, the impact of Internet activity is felt in the real world 
and thus the resolution of Internet defamation cases must occur in a real-world 
jurisdiction.6  The Internet has created a global village where information can 
 
 1. IQUOTE: BRILLIANCE AND BANTER FROM THE INTERNET AGE 6 (David L. Green ed., 
2008). 
 2. While records from early antiquity are scarce, libel and slander have existed as causes of 
action for at least 2500 years.  Roscoe J. C. Dorsey, Roman Sources of Some English Principles 
of Equity and Common Law Rules, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1233, 1241 (1938).  Under the laws of the 
Roman Republic, “[w]hen anyone publicly abuses another in a loud voice, or writes a poem for 
the purpose of insulting him, or rendering him infamous, he shall be beaten with a rod until he 
dies.”  The Twelve Tables, in 1 THE CIVIL LAW 70 (S.P. Scott, trans., 1932). 
 3. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143, 143, 145 (N.J. 1948). 
 4. MATTHEW COLLINS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET ¶ 26.03 (3d ed. 
2010). 
 5. Kathleen Parker, Defusing the Google Bomb, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 28, 2009, 
at A13. 
 6. ROLF H. WEBER, SHAPING INTERNET GOVERNANCE:  REGULATORY CHALLENGES 3–4 
(2010).  While most, if not all, Internet defamation cases have been Internet libel cases, this Note 
will explore defamation, in general, on the Internet.  The Internet is no longer restricted to written 
content, and websites such as YouTube make video-based defamation readily accessible.  
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travel quickly around the world, but our court system is still bound by 
traditional geographic boundaries.7  When both the plaintiff and the defendant 
are residents of the same real-world jurisdiction, selection of a proper court is 
generally an easy process.8  But when an out-of-state defendant has no contacts 
with a state other than his Internet activity, disagreement over jurisdiction is 
sure to follow.9 
Missouri had its first chance to consider jurisdiction in an Internet 
defamation case when the Court of Appeals for the Southern District decided 
Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith.10  Defendants Karen Fischer-Smith of Arizona and 
Patricia Hall of Pennsylvania created the website stop-whisperinglane.com, 
which accused a Missouri dog breeder of being a “puppy mill” and called 
Missouri the “puppy mill capital of the world.”11  In deciding that the 
defendants’ website established the minimum contacts required for jurisdiction 
in Missouri to be appropriate, the court warned, “[I]f you pick a fight in 
Missouri, you can reasonably expect to settle it here.”12  The court used a test 
from the 1985 case of Calder v. Jones, now known as the Calder effects test, 
to conclude that the defendants expressly aimed their tortious activity toward 
 
Missouri has recognized that defamation over a broadcast or in electronic communication, 
whether spoken or written, is classified as libel.  Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 
(Mo. 1993).  Missouri courts have not addressed, however, if “electronic communication” 
includes online videos or podcasts.  In fact, courts worldwide have varied views on radio 
defamation.  Some courts would consider a YouTube video slander because the defamatory 
words reach the ear, others would consider it libel because of the visibility and wide 
dissemination of such a transmission, and yet other courts take a middle position.  See JOHN G. 
FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 604 (9th ed. 1998).  Therefore, because Missouri statutes speak of 
libel and slander interchangeably and the issues are the same regardless of classification, this 
discussion will focus on defamation in general.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 509.210 (2000). 
 7. However, those geographic boundaries are not as solid in some countries.  See infra Part 
II.F for a discussion of jurisdictional choice in the United Kingdom and Australia. 
 8. A good example in Missouri is the “MySpace trial” where teen Megan Meier committed 
suicide after neighbor Lori Drew created a fake MySpace page and told Meier “[t]he world would 
be a better place without you.”  Steve Pokin, No Charges to be Filed over Meier Suicide, 
STLTODAY.COM (Dec. 4, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/suburban-journals/article_ 
fd48db3e-b0ad-5332-b5a5-4ac231bc378c.html.  As both Meier and Drew resided in St. Charles 
County, Missouri, both the St. Charles County prosecutor and the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern 
District of Missouri had the opportunity to bring suit (though both declined to do so).  Id.  
However, this case is one of a growing number of Internet cases where jurisdiction was deemed 
proper out of state.  The third option for trial, and where the case was eventually tried, was 
California, the state where MySpace.com’s servers were physically located.  Robert Patrick, 3 
Years Sought in Drew Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 7, 2009, at A4. 
 9. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 10. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 391–92 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 11. Jeff Gorman, Dog Breeder’s Libel Lawsuit Reinstated, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE 
(July 19, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/07/19/28948.htm. 
 12. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 398. 
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Missouri and thus jurisdiction was appropriate.13  However, the court stressed 
that it only sought to decide this case and would “let others ponder the grand 
scheme of things.”14 
This Note will take the step that the Southern District chose not to and will 
examine potential jurisdictional rules the State can use in future Internet 
defamation cases.  Part II will provide a short history of personal jurisdiction, 
including rules developed for defamation cases and Internet cases, and will 
conclude by examining the Southern District’s approach in Baldwin.  Part III 
will examine the framework used in Baldwin, specifically the idea of “express 
aiming” in an Internet context, and will compare that framework to other 
jurisdictional approaches suggested by courts, scholars, and international 
entities.  Part IV concludes by predicting the jurisdictional framework Missouri 
will eventually adopt for Internet defamation cases. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
A. Post-war Expansion of Personal Jurisdiction 
In the forty years following World War II, the United States Supreme 
Court established the contemporary basis for personal jurisdiction.15 Personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is appropriate when the defendant has 
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”16  
In judging minimum contacts, a court should focus on “the relationship among 
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”17  Minimum contacts sufficiently 
connect a defendant with the forum when the defendant “should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there.”18  Minimum contacts exist when a 
defendant has “purposefully directed” himself toward residents of the forum 
state.19  When reviewing fair play and substantial justice, courts “may evaluate 
the burden on the defendant, the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the 
dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, 
[and] the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies.”20  However, courts must not make litigation “so 
 
 13. Id. at 397–98. 
 14. Id. at 395. 
 15. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 
(1977); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 16. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotations omitted). 
 17. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204. 
 18. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297. 
 19. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476. 
 20. Id. at 477 (internal quotations omitted). 
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gravely difficult and inconvenient” that a party has a “severe disadvantage” 
compared to the opponent.21 
Additionally, States will only bring a nonresident into their courts where 
proper under that state’s long-arm statute.22  The long-arm statutes of many 
states permit jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus showing minimum contacts while 
refraining from offending the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice is typically sufficient to establish jurisdiction in American courts.23 
B. Personal Jurisdiction and Defamation 
The Missouri long-arm statute applies to defamation cases when the 
elements of that statute are met.24  The long-arm statute states, in part, that 
“[a]ny person . . . who in person or through an agent does any of the acts 
enumerated in this section . . . [submits himself] to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such 
acts: . . . (3) The commission of any tortious act within this state . . . .”25 
In Pfeiffer v. International Academy of Biomagnetic Medicine,26 a 
nonresident’s publication of a magazine article which allegedly libeled a 
Missouri resident was considered a “tortious act within the state” because it 
produced actionable consequences within Missouri.27  Therefore, jurisdiction 
was proper under Missouri’s long-arm statute.28 
In addition to satisfying a state’s long-arm statute, additional jurisdictional 
rules have applied in defamation cases to determine whether the defendant’s 
conduct has established minimum contacts with the forum state.  The landmark 
case for such personal jurisdiction quarrels in defamation cases is Calder v. 
Jones.29  There, actress Shirley Jones sued the National Enquirer in her home 
state of California regarding an allegedly libelous article in its magazine.30  
The article was written and published in Florida, by a Florida corporation with 
 
 21. Id. at 478. 
 22. COLLINS, supra note 4, ¶ 32.01.  For Missouri’s long-arm statute, see MO. REV. STAT. § 
506.500 (2000). 
 23. COLLINS, supra note 4, ¶ 32.01. 
 24. See, e.g., Norman v. Fischer Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 313, 316–17 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
 25. See MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (2000). 
 26. Pfeiffer v. Int’l Acad. of Biomagnetic Med., 521 F. Supp. 1331 (W.D. Mo. 1981). 
 27. Id. at 1333, 1336. 
 28. Id. at 1336. 
 29. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 30. Id. at 785.  The Court alternately refers to the National Enquirer as a “magazine” and a 
“newspaper.”  See id. at 784, 785.  While the classification of this periodical does not change the 
legal analysis, this Note refers to it solely as a “magazine” to avoid confusion. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] DEFAMATION IN THE INTERNET AGE 591 
its principal place of business in Florida, but issues of the magazine were sold 
nationwide, including in California.31 
The Court addressed the traditional framework and remarked that the 
defendant must have minimum contacts with California so that a lawsuit there 
would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.32  The 
Court commented that the libelous story concerned the California activities of 
a California plaintiff with a California-centered career.33  Therefore, because 
(1) petitioners committed an intentional tort, (2) California was the focal point 
of the statements, and (3) the brunt of the harm was felt there, jurisdiction was 
“proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in 
California.”34 
Calder’s companion case, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., discussed the 
plaintiff’s required minimum contacts with the forum state.35  There, the 
plaintiff chose to bring suit in New Hampshire because it was the only state 
where the statute of limitations had not run.36  While the plaintiff had 
essentially no connection to New Hampshire and was obviously forum 
shopping, the Court found that a plaintiff is not required to establish minimum 
contacts with a state for personal jurisdiction over the defendant to be 
appropriate.37  Calder noted, however, that the plaintiff’s contacts with a 
forum, if substantial, might allow jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s absence 
would otherwise prohibit jurisdiction.38 
C. Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet 
Courts initially struggled in applying this jurisdictional framework to 
Internet activities, and early cases treated the Internet as providing minimum 
contacts in every forum.39  However, courts quickly abandoned this broad 
 
 31. Id. at 785. 
 32. Id. at 788. 
 33. Id. at 788–89. 
 34. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90. 
 35. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984). 
 36. Id. at 773. 
 37. Id. at 779.  While this Note focuses primarily on the ability of a Missouri plaintiff to 
bring suit in Missouri, Keeton would allow a nonresident plaintiff to bring suit in Missouri against 
a Missouri defendant or a nonresident defendant with minimum contacts in Missouri.  See id. 
 38. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788. 
 39. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996).  
This rule is similar to those in the United Kingdom and Australia where traditional jurisdictional 
rules apply to defamation cases.  COLLINS, supra note 4, ¶ 18.70–.71.  There, jurisdiction is 
proper where the defamatory material is “published,” which means anywhere it is read, heard, or 
seen.  Id.  Therefore, for Internet cases in those countries, jurisdiction is proper in any court, and 
the court’s only inquiry is whether to decline jurisdiction due to forum non conveniens.  Id. 
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jurisdictional rule, motivated by a framework developed in a Pennsylvania 
district court.40 
In Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., the court developed a 
passive versus active test—also known as the “sliding scale” test—where the 
court examined the level of interaction between a website and its viewers.41  If 
the website is a passive website that merely makes information available to 
residents of another state should they seek it, then jurisdiction in that foreign 
state would not be appropriate.42  If, however, the website is used to develop 
business contacts in another state or actively seeks out residents of that state, 
jurisdiction there would be appropriate.43  In the middle, where an interactive 
website allows a user to exchange information with the host computer, 
“jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and 
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web 
site.”44 
Under Zippo, because a passive website does not actively encourage 
residents of the forum state to access the site, the creator of that website has 
not purposefully availed himself of the forum state.45  Courts following Zippo 
argue that the Internet would expose a defendant to jurisdiction anywhere the 
Internet is located if a passive website constituted purposeful availment.46  
Some courts have found Zippo to be too broad and have narrowed its scope; 
for example, in Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, the 
court found that for those cases falling in the middle category of the Zippo test, 
the defendant must also have had “deliberate action” within the forum state.47 
 
 40. Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 46. Id. at 420.  As most Internet cases involve business contacts, the full Zippo spectrum can 
be viewed with business cases, starting on one end with CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 
1257 (6th Cir. 1996).  There, CompuServe created a website in Ohio to sell products to its 
customers in many states and thus a customer who accessed the website and completed a business 
transaction purposefully availed himself to the courts of Ohio.  Id. at 1264–65.  At the other end 
of the spectrum is Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d. Cir. 1997).  There, the 
defendant created a website for a jazz club in Missouri that used the trademarked logo of a jazz 
club in New York.  Id. at 26–27.  However, the defendant did not conduct business through the 
website, but merely provided information about his business.  See id. at 27, 29.  Therefore, he did 
not purposefully avail himself of New York and jurisdiction there would be inappropriate.  Id. at 
29. 
 47. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 921 (D. Or. 
1999). 
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While many courts have embraced the sliding scale test, Zippo has not 
been immune to criticism.48  As Dr. Michael Geist discusses, “the majority of 
Web sites are neither entirely passive nor completely active.  Accordingly, they 
fall into the ‘middle zone,’ which requires courts to gauge all relevant evidence 
and determine whether the site is ‘primarily passive’ or ‘primarily active.’”49  
Further, an active website may appear to be passive due to the presence of 
“cookies” or other behind-the-scenes data collection.50  Finally, Internet 
technology is developing so rapidly that designations of “passive” and “active” 
make judicial consistency difficult as a “passive” website with merely an e-
mail link would have been considered “active” ten or fifteen years ago.51 
D. Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Defamation 
When the Internet was in its infancy, most scholars assumed that the 
existing jurisdictional framework would be sufficient to handle Internet 
defamation cases.52  Once Internet defamation cases began reaching the courts, 
however, Zippo’s “sliding scale” test was gaining popularity and proved a 
useful early solution.53  This approach was especially popular when the 
Internet was new, as the line separating passive and interactive websites was 
easily determined.54  However, as the Internet has become more interactive as 
 
 48. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel:  The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach 
to Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 473, 489 (2004) (suggesting Zippo should not be 
followed at all in libel cases). 
 49. Michael Geist, The Shift Toward “Targeting” for Internet Jurisdiction, in WHO RULES 
THE NET? 91, 104 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr. eds., 2003). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  Dr. Geist also discusses the cost of websites for businesses and the reality that 
companies will only create a website if it will benefit them financially.  Id.  Because profit 
concerns will always demand an “active” website over a “passive” one, the Zippo test will allow 
jurisdiction in all courts where a business is the defendant.  Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework 
for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083, 
1133 (1996) (“[B]y appropriately applying the existing jurisdictional framework to the 
cyberspace frontier, courts should be able to protect cyberspace travelers from unfairly and 
unreasonably being pulled into a strange new world that they never intended to visit.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 790, 791, 795, 797 (W.D. Tenn. 
2000) (finding jurisdiction was not proper in Tennessee when Florida corporation maintained 
only a passive website); Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694–95, 701–02 (E.D. Va. 
1999) (finding jurisdiction was proper in Virginia when residents of Texas and New Mexico 
interacted through message boards transmitted through a Virginia Internet service provider); 
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 57 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding jurisdiction was proper in the 
plaintiff’s domicile where the defendant’s website was interactive). 
 54. For example, in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., the court declined jurisdiction 
because Step Two’s website was in Spanish and its purchase fields did not accommodate 
addresses from the United States. 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003).  Websites are not as 
straightforward anymore.  Today, websites use social media to allow visitors to communicate 
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a whole, more courts are turning to the Calder effects test.55  In fact, some 
scholars suggest the passive/active distinction may not even be relevant in libel 
cases as a passive website can harm a person’s reputation just as easily as an 
active website.56 
1. Applying Calder to Internet Cases 
When applied to Internet cases, courts have found that all three prongs of 
the Calder effects test must be present to establish jurisdiction.57  However, the 
deciding prong in most cases is whether the conduct is “expressly aimed” at 
the forum state.58 
While courts agree that “express aiming” is important, their definitions of 
that term vary.  In Revell v. Lidov, the Fifth Circuit examined an article posted 
on an Internet bulletin board.59  The article accused Revell of complicity in a 
conspiracy and cover-up of Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over 
Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.60  The court found there was no “express 
aiming,” in part because “there is no reference to Texas in the article or any 
reliance on Texas sources.”61  A defendant cannot merely post something on 
the Internet and purposefully avail himself of “some forum someplace,” but 
must have knowledge of the forum where the plaintiff will be harmed and 
 
with each other, and this perceived interactivity is perhaps more important than actual 
interactivity.  Nan Cui et al., The Influence of Social Presence on Consumers’ Perceptions of the 
Interactivity of Web Sites, J. OF INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING, 36, 45 (Fall 2010), http://jiad.org/art 
icle138. 
 55.  For a stark example of how the Internet has changed since Zippo was decided, consider 
CNN.com’s 1997 coverage of Princess Diana’s funeral route, The Official Schedule for Princess 
Diana’s Funeral, CNN.COM (Sept. 4, 1997, 6:28 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/04/ 
diana.funeral.route/.  The article is on “CNN Interactive” and includes links to a message board 
and a Quicktime movie.  Id.  For CNN.com’s 2011 coverage of a happier story for the British 
Royal Family, see Richard Allen Greene, William and Catherine Marry in Royal Wedding at 
Westminster Abbey, CNN.COM (April 29, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/ 
europe/04/29/uk.royal.wedding.kate.william/index.html.  The article includes buttons to share the 
article on Facebook and Twitter, embedded comments, and interactive advertisements tailored 
toward a user’s location and browsing history.  Id.; see Cui, supra note 54, at 36. 
 56. Borchers, supra note 48, at 489. 
 57. See, e.g., Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Bird, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072–73 (D. Ariz. 
2010).  Those prongs are (1) the defendant committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly 
aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the 
defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.  Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–
90 (1984). 
 58. See, e.g., Xcentric Ventures, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 1072–73; Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 
527, 536–37 (Minn. 2002). 
 59. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 60. Id. at 469. 
 61. Id. at 474. 
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reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.62  This case represents the 
“narrow” view of Calder, where the forum state must be the “focal point” of 
the tort, and the defendant must target not only the plaintiff residing within the 
forum state, but additionally must target the forum state itself.63 
Other courts have adopted a broader view of Calder, where jurisdiction is 
proper when the defendant targets a plaintiff and knows the plaintiff is a 
resident of the forum state.64  In Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National, 
Inc., Bancroft filed suit in California to obtain declaratory judgment that it had 
the right to use the web address masters.com, which it had previously 
registered.65  Augusta National sent a cease-and-desist letter to Bancroft in 
California and an additional letter to a domain name registration company in 
Virginia, which led to the lawsuit.66  Because Augusta National knew Bancroft 
was located in California and knew the effects of its letters would be felt in 
California, the court held that Augusta National had purposefully availed itself 
of California and jurisdiction there was proper.67 
Even when the website itself is insufficient to establish minimum contacts, 
a court may use other online activities to find jurisdiction proper.  In Zidon v. 
Pickrell, the District Court of North Dakota used the Zippo test to determine 
that the defendant’s website was interactive.68  Then, using the Calder effects 
test, the court examined all of the defendant’s activities, including e-mails to 
 
 62. Id. at 475.  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit recently found jurisdiction was improper in 
Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010).  There, McNamee made statements 
alleging athlete Roger Clemens took steroids, and those statements were included in baseball’s 
Mitchell Report and posted online at SI.com.  Id. at 377.  The statements did not involve activity 
in Texas and were not directed toward Texas residents (they were directed toward residents of all 
fifty states).  Id. at 380.  Therefore, jurisdiction was not proper in Texas, even though Clemens 
alleged harm there.  Id. 
 63. Cf. Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1074 n.9 (10th Cir. 
2008).  While the court held the defendant must have made the forum state the focal point of the 
tort, this can be accomplished indirectly.  Id. at 1075.  The court remarked: 
[The defendant’s actions are] something like a bank shot in basketball.  A player who 
shoots the ball off of the backboard intends to hit the backboard, but he does so in the 
service of his further intention of putting the ball into the basket.  Here, defendants 
intended to send [notice] to eBay in California, but they did so with the ultimate purpose 
of cancelling plaintiffs’ auction in Colorado.  Their “express aim” thus can be said to have 
reached into Colorado in much the same way that a basketball player’s express aim in 
shooting off of the backboard is not simply to hit the backboard, but to make a basket. 
Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 65. Id. at 1084–85. 
 66. Id. at 1085. 
 67. Id. at 1088. 
 68. Zidon v. Pickrell, 344 F. Supp. 2d 624, 630 (D.N.D. 2004). 
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North Dakota residents, to conclude the defendant established minimum 
contacts with the state.69 
The Seventh Circuit recently reviewed Calder in an online dispute between 
dog breeders.70  In Tamburo v. Dworkin, the plaintiff created an online dog 
pedigree database using information from the defendants’ websites.71  In 
response, the defendants posted statements on their websites accusing the 
plaintiff of theft and hacking, encouraged others to boycott his products, and 
then posted his home address in Illinois and encouraged others to harass him.72  
The court found that while the defendants had never been to Illinois, the 
“express aiming” prong of Calder is met when an intentional tort is directed at 
an Illinois resident with the express goal of inflicting harm in Illinois and harm 
is felt in the state.73  Because one of the defendants did not know the plaintiff 
lived in Illinois, the intentional tort committed by that defendant could not 
have been aimed at Illinois and thus personal jurisdiction over that defendant 
was improper.74 
2. “If You Pick a Fight in Missouri . . .” 
Missouri addressed personal jurisdiction of a nonresident defendant in an 
Internet libel case for the first time in 2010, when the Court of Appeals decided 
Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith.75  Plaintiff Baldwin ran the Whispering Lake Dog 
Kennel in Missouri, which not only breeds, sells, boards and shows dogs for 
clients, but also exhibits them in American Kennel Club shows.76  Defendants 
Fischer-Smith, of Arizona, and Hall, of Pennsylvania, were competitors of 
Baldwin both in American Kennel Club shows and in selling Chinese Crested 
dogs.77 
Defendant Fischer-Smith created a website, www.stop-whispering 
lane.com, in 2007 and was the “web master” of the site during its year of 
 
 69. Id. at 630–31. 
 70. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 71. Id. at 698. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 707. 
 74. Id. at 708. 
 75. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 391–92 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).  While 
Baldwin is the first Missouri decision involving jurisdiction in an Internet libel case, federal 
courts in Missouri have previously addressed Internet jurisdiction, finding jurisdiction was 
improper under a Zippo analysis.  E.g., Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 
2d 1082, 1087, 1090 (E.D. Mo. 2001).  Internet jurisdiction was also at issue in State ex rel. 
Nixon v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., but the court found sufficient minimum contacts to find jurisdiction was 
proper through a traditional jurisdictional approach.  29 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).  
Both parties in Baldwin agreed that State ex rel. Nixon had little value for their case.  Baldwin, 
315 S.W.3d at 394. 
 76. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 392. 
 77. Id. 
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operation.78  On the website, Defendant Hall stated that the Baldwin family 
moved from Pennsylvania to Missouri “under cover of darkness” to avoid 
prosecution in Pennsylvania for animal abuse and neglect.79  The website went 
on to call Missouri “the Puppy Mill capitol [sic] of the WORLD.”80  In its year 
of existence, the website attracted 2500 hits worldwide, with 25 of those hits 
from Missouri residents.81 
The court ignored the Zippo test completely, preferring instead to examine 
the Calder effects test.82  After reading cases “far and wide,” the court 
determined that cases like Baldwin generally turn on the second prong of the 
effects test as stated by Tamburo, or “express aiming.”83  Following Tamburo, 
their inquiry was “whether the conduct underlying the claims was purposely 
directed at the forum state.”84  Both Tamburo and Baldwin involved Internet 
activities within the dog-breeding world; the main concern in each case being 
whether the nonresident defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum 
state.85  Due to these factual similarities, the court followed the reasoning and 
analysis from Tamburo and determined jurisdiction was proper in Missouri.86  
Specifically, the court followed the conclusions from Tamburo that Calder 
requires both a forum-state injury and “something more” directed at the state, 
and that the Internet can provide an “electronic entry” into the state.87 
The court then expanded on its reasons for concluding as it did.88  First, the 
“express aiming” requirement from Calder requires only residents of the 
forum to be targeted by conduct, not the state itself.89  Second, even if Calder 
 
 78. Appellants’ Brief at 6, Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) 
(No. SD30235). 
 79. Id. at 7. 
 80. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 398.  Whether the Baldwins ran a “puppy mill” or not, even 
newspapers in Missouri have called the state the “puppy mill capital” of the United States as 40% 
of puppies sold in U.S. pet stores are bred in the state.  Barbara Shelly, Joe the Plumber Plunges 
into Missouri Puppy Mills, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 8, 2010, at A14. 
 81. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 392. 
 82. Id. at 392–93.  While Baldwin fails to mention Zippo, it does adopt the analysis of the 
Seventh Circuit from Tamburo v. Dworkin.  Id. at 395–98.  The Seventh Circuit mentions Zippo 
briefly in a footnote, stating that the test has limited relevance in intentional tort cases and sharing 
its hesitation to fashion a special jurisdictional test for Internet cases.  Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 
F.3d 693, 703 n.7 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 83. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 394. 
 84. Id. at 396 (quoting Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 702). 
 85. Id. at 396; Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 698, 702. 
 86. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 397. 
 87. Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 706. 
 88. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 397–98. 
 89. Id. at 397.  The court relies here on language from Burger King, which states that a 
defendant receives “fair warning” that he may be subject to suit in a forum when he purposefully 
directs conduct toward residents of that forum.  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
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were interpreted to require targeting of the state, comments on the website 
established that the defendants targeted Missouri itself when they called the 
state the “Puppy Mill capitol [sic] of the WORLD.”90  Third, the court was not 
concerned with the possibility that an Internet defendant might be pulled into 
any jurisdiction where their conduct caused harm.91  Fourth, in looking at a 
recent Missouri Supreme Court decision, the court concluded that when the 
content of a communication into Missouri gives rise to an intentional tort 
claim, the defendant has purposefully availed himself of Missouri and 
jurisdiction is proper.92  Finally, the court paraphrased the Fifth Circuit in 
Revell v. Lidov and warned that “if you pick a fight in Missouri, you can 
reasonably expect to settle it here.”93 
As Baldwin was a case of first impression, the court could have developed 
a specific jurisdictional framework for Internet defamation cases, thereby 
setting precedent for other Missouri courts to follow.  However, the court 
specifically mentioned that its decision in Baldwin is not meant to create a 
universal rule regarding personal jurisdiction for Internet defamation cases in 
Missouri.94  The court did not specify whether it believed there should be a 
specific framework for the Internet, in essence creating separate tests for 
Internet defamation and defamation by other means, but simply left the task to 
others to “ponder the grand scheme of things.”95 
As cases involving the Internet will only increase in frequency, Baldwin 
provides the opportunity to begin Missouri’s discussion on jurisdictional 
concerns associated with the evolving technology.  In the next section, the 
Baldwin approach will be compared to tests from other courts and scholars to 
determine which jurisdictional approach would work best for Missouri. 
II.  EVALUATING JURISDICTIONAL PROPOSALS 
There are three good jurisdictional options in Baldwin and in most Internet 
defamation cases: the plaintiff’s home state, the defendant’s home state, and 
 
472 (1985).  The defendants wanted the plaintiff to also show they targeted the State of Missouri 
itself.  See Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 397. 
 90. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 397–98. 
 91. Id. at 398. 
 92. Id.  Where the defendant corresponded with plaintiff by sending fraudulent documents 
regarding a New York apartment to plaintiff’s Missouri residence, the content of the 
communication giving rise to a fraud claim was in Missouri and therefore the defendant 
purposefully availed himself of Missouri.  Bryant v. Smith Interior Design Grp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 
227, 229–30, 235 (Mo. 2010). 
 93. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 398. 
 94. Id. at 398. 
 95. Id. at 395. 
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the location of the Internet server where the libelous statement was posted.96  A 
plaintiff can always choose to bring suit in the defendant’s home state to avoid 
jurisdictional concerns.97  While a few plaintiffs have brought suit in the 
jurisdiction where the Internet server is located, the issue in Baldwin and 
discussed here is whether a nonresident defendant in an Internet defamation 
case can be brought into Missouri courts.98  Before discussing the various tests 
used by the courts and suggested by scholars, a brief review of Missouri’s 
long-arm statute is needed. 
A. The Missouri Long-Arm Statute: Is Internet Defamation “Committed 
Within the State”? 
Missouri’s long-arm statute states in part that a person subjects himself to 
the jurisdiction of Missouri courts for “[t]he commission of a tortious act 
within this state.”99  Because defamation is a tort under Missouri law,100 a 
defendant is subject to Missouri courts when he commits defamation in 
Missouri.101  The statute has been read to extend to the bounds of due process, 
so a defendant can be haled into Missouri courts when (1) he commits a 
tortious act within the state and (2) the defendant has minimum contacts such 
that it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to 
meet the requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.102  The defendants in Baldwin did not challenge the 
trial court’s ruling that they committed a tortious act in Missouri, so the court 
focused solely on minimum contacts to establish jurisdiction.103  However, 
because Missouri’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction to the extent of due 
process, the statutory inquiry and constitutional inquiry are the same.104  Even 
if the defendants in Baldwin had challenged whether the alleged defamation 
occurred in Missouri, the court’s analysis would likely not have changed.105 
Missouri follows the common law for libel and slander in that a statement 
is defamatory if it harms the reputation of another.106  To meet Missouri’s 
long-arm statute, the plaintiff’s reputation must have been harmed in 
 
 96. For an example of an Internet defamation case brought in the Internet server’s home 
state, see the “MySpace trial,” where the trial between two Missouri residents was in California, 
where MySpace had its principal place of business.  Patrick, supra note 8. 
 97. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). 
 98. See Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 391–92. 
 99. MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (2000). 
 100. See Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 392. 
 103. Id. at 392 n.3. 
 104. See COLLINS, supra note 4, ¶ 32.01. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Mo. 1985). 
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Missouri.107  If, under the Calder effects test, the defendant expressly aimed 
his conduct at the forum state, then the harm to reputation would occur in the 
forum state as well.108  Therefore, when the plaintiff shows the defendant 
expressly aimed his activities at the forum state, Missouri’s long-arm statute is 
satisfied.109 
B. Missouri and the Zippo Test 
Only two cases in Missouri state courts have addressed Internet 
jurisdiction, and only Baldwin addresses jurisdictional concerns for Internet 
defamation.110  The other case, State ex rel. Nixon v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., involved 
business contacts for a beer of the month club.111  While neither of these cases 
even acknowledged Zippo, United States District Courts operating under 
Missouri law have addressed its “sliding scale” test. 
In Uncle Sam’s Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Uncle Sam’s Army Navy 
Outfitters-Manhattan, Inc., the Eastern District of Missouri examined a 
website which fell in the middle of the Zippo spectrum.112  Focusing solely on 
the interactivity of the website and the number of visits by Missouri residents, 
the court found that jurisdiction was not proper.113 
Similarly, in Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co. v. Stowell, the Eastern District of 
Missouri found another website in the middle of the Zippo spectrum and found 
that, while Missouri residents could visit the website, their inability to do 
business over the website made jurisdiction improper.114  To hold otherwise, 
the court said, “would not comport with traditional notions of what qualifies as 
purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protections of the forum state.”115 
In Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., the Eastern District of 
Missouri used Missouri law in examining a slip-and-fall case in a Las Vegas 
casino where the casino’s website fell in the middle of the Zippo spectrum.116  
The court found that the interactive website operated by the casino did not 
permit specific jurisdiction because the cause of action did not arise out of the 
 
 107. See id. 
 108. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984). 
 109. See MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (2000). 
 110. State ex rel. Nixon v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., 29 S.W.3d 828, 833–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); 
Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 391–92 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 111. Beer Nuts, 29 S.W.3d at 833. 
 112. Uncle Sam’s Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Uncle Sam’s Army Navy Outfitters-Manhattan, 
Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 919, 923 (E.D. Mo. 2000). 
 113. Id. at 924. 
 114. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Stowell, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1157–58 (E.D. Mo. 2001). 
 115. Id. at 1159. 
 116. Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084, 1087 (E.D. Mo. 
2001). 
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website.117  Further, when addressing whether the website gave rise to general 
jurisdiction, the court found that their analysis could not “begin and end with 
the ‘active’ and ‘passive’ labels.”118  Instead, because the plaintiffs failed to 
show the website was “targeted to users from Missouri,” general jurisdiction 
was not proper.119 
While these cases involving Internet business with Missouri residents all 
considered Zippo, courts across the country have moved away from Zippo and 
toward a targeting test for Internet defamation cases.120  Considering the 
Southern District’s failure to mention Zippo’s “sliding scale” test in Baldwin, 
focusing on the targeting itself rather than the technological means,121 Missouri 
is unlikely to adopt Zippo to analyze any future Internet defamation cases. 
C. “Express Aiming”: Targeting the State or its Residents (or Both)? 
1. Targeting the Residents of a State 
Assuming for the moment that Calder is an appropriate test to evaluate 
minimum contacts in Internet defamation cases, disagreement will arise over 
exactly who or what the defendant must target.  In Baldwin, the court read 
Calder to require express aiming at the residents of the forum state.122  
Therefore, because the defendants targeted residents within Missouri, they 
expressly aimed their conduct at Missouri and jurisdiction was proper.123  
However, the court also acknowledged that Calder may require express aiming 
at the forum state itself, and not the residents of that state.124  This conclusion 
comes from a literal reading of Calder, which states that jurisdiction is proper 
because “California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm 
suffered.”125  Finally, the defendants in Baldwin argued that Calder requires 
express aiming toward both residents of the state and the forum state itself.126 
The view taken by the Southern District in Baldwin, that the “express 
aiming” prong of the Calder effects test requires the targeting of residents of 
the forum state, is widely supported by precedent.127  The court finds support 
 
 117. Id. at 1089. 
 118. Id. at 1091. 
 119. Id. at 1092. 
 120. See GEIST, supra note 49, at 99–100. 
 121. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 393–94 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 122. Id. at 393. 
 123. Id. at 397–98. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (emphasis added). 
 126. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 397. 
 127. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2010); Dudnikov v. 
Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1077–78 (10th Cir. 2008); Finley v. River N. 
Records, Inc., 148 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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from Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, where the Supreme Court stated, “a 
forum legitimately may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who 
‘purposefully directs’ his activities toward forum residents.”128  In Baldwin, the 
defendants targeted the plaintiff with their defamatory statements and sought 
readers in Missouri, and this targeting was found to be sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction.129 
2. Targeting the Community 
Even courts concluding that a forum’s residents must be targeted will 
disagree over which residents must be targeted for jurisdiction to be proper.130  
Professor Amy Kristin Sanders suggests that, in defamation cases, defining the 
community to which the plaintiff belongs is important and offers a number of 
solutions.131  First, Professor Sanders suggests a “mixed-methods” four-factor 
approach to determine community in Internet defamation cases, looking at (1) 
where a plaintiff lives, (2) where a plaintiff works, (3) where the statements 
were published, and (4) who was intended as the target audience.132  While this 
approach will more accurately provide protection to a plaintiff when 
warranted, Professor Sanders does acknowledge the inherent risk of 
inconsistent results in a fact-based factors test.133  Had this test been used in 
Baldwin, the court likely would have found jurisdiction was proper as the 
plaintiff lives and works in Missouri, the statements were published in 
Pennsylvania, and the target audience was dog owners/buyers in Missouri and 
dog breeders nationwide.134 
Second, Professor Sanders suggests a “specific community” approach 
where the jurisdictional decision is made by looking at a subset of the general 
public—the “art community” for example.135  By determining specific 
jurisdictional rules for each specific community, future litigants would easily 
know where they stand and could better determine their liability for a 
statement before litigation commences.136  For example, in Baldwin, the “dog-
 
 128. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 129. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 397–98. 
 130. Compare Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 
2000) (finding that knowledge that the plaintiff lived in the state was sufficient for jurisdiction), 
with Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding “something 
more” than posting a newspaper article online where the forum state’s residents could read it was 
required for jurisdiction). 
 131. Amy Kristin Sanders, Defining Defamation: Community in the Age of the Internet, 15 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 231, 233 (2010). 
 132. Id. at 259. 
 133. Id. at 260. 
 134. See Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 392, 398. 
 135. Sanders, supra note 131, at 260. 
 136. Id. at 261. 
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breeder community” would be examined and rules developed in Baldwin and 
Tamburo v. Dworkin, a dog-breeding case from the Seventh Circuit, would 
establish the jurisdictional basis for that community going forward.137  
However, Professor Sanders acknowledges that defining a plaintiff’s 
community would become increasingly difficult and this could impact other 
aspects of the defamation tort.138  Within a small community, a person is more 
likely to be considered a “public figure” and therefore the burden of showing 
actual malice may be unfairly required when using this approach.139 
This problem of defining the community would present a struggle for early 
litigants under such a framework as parties would not know whether they 
belong to a large community or a small community.  Perhaps in response to 
this concern, Professor Sanders suggests a plaintiff-centered approach, where a 
plaintiff has the burden of showing what community he or she belongs to and 
the harm to reputation suffered within that community.140  The plaintiff’s 
choice of community would narrow the court’s review as to the harm incurred 
as a result of the defamatory statement and could help define damages as 
well.141  In Baldwin, if the plaintiff suggested a community of “Missouri dog 
breeders,” jurisdiction would be practically assured because the plaintiff would 
easily be able to show his reputation was harmed among Missouri dog 
breeders.  However, the plaintiff’s damages would then be limited to that harm 
attributed to the plaintiff’s reputation among Missouri dog breeders alone.142  
Alternately, the plaintiff could suggest a community of United States dog 
breeders, Missouri general public, or United States general public, each 
reducing the chances of proving personal jurisdiction in Missouri, but 
increasing potential damages.143 
Professor Sanders does not discuss how the plaintiff-centered approach 
would impact the “single publication” rule for defamation cases.  While the 
“multiple publication” rule allows a plaintiff to bring a cause of action in every 
state where his reputation is harmed, the “single publication” rule, followed by 
Missouri courts for almost one hundred years,144 allows the plaintiff to bring 
 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 262. 
 140. Sanders, supra note 131, at 262. 
 141. Id. at 263. 
 142. See Sanders, supra note 131, at 263. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Missouri adopted the “multiple publication” rule in a case of first impression, Julian v. 
Kansas City Star Co., 107 S.W. 496, 500 (Mo. 1907). 
It is the publication of the libel, not the printing of it, that gives the right of action.  When 
the publisher gives out his paper to be circulated, not only in one, but in many, counties, 
and it is circulated as he intended, he is deemed in law to have published it in all the 
counties, and the act is no less a publication in one county than another. 
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only one cause of action for “any single publication . . . such as any one edition 
or issue of a newspaper or book . . . or any one broadcast over radio or 
television.”145  If the plaintiff in Baldwin sought a Missouri court for damages 
to his reputation among Missouri dog breeders, could he then ask an Illinois 
court for damages to his reputation among Illinois breeders?  Defining the 
community is an interesting idea and one that may deserve exploration, though 
Missouri would need to thoroughly examine the potential impact on 
implementing changes in community. 
3. Targeting the State, not its Residents 
Perhaps Missouri courts should adopt the literal reading of the Calder test, 
that jurisdiction is only proper when the defendant targets the forum state itself 
with defamatory statements.146  Currently, defamation in Missouri requires that 
the plaintiff’s reputation be harmed.147  Therefore, if the forum state itself must 
be targeted, it would be in addition to the common law requirement in 
Missouri that residents of the state must be targeted.148  In Baldwin, the court 
rejects this dual requirement for jurisdiction, though the court did note that the 
defendant targeted Missouri as well as its residents.149  Even the language in 
Tamburo, whose analysis was adopted by the court in Baldwin,150 suggests a 
literal interpretation is misguided as the court concluded that, because the 
defendants purposefully targeted Tamburo and his business in Illinois, the 
defendants “‘purposefully directed’ their activities at Illinois.”151  Therefore, it 
is sufficient under the Calder test to target residents of the forum state.152  
While Missouri could narrow the scope of its targeting test by requiring 
targeting of both the residents and the state, there is no good reason why 
 
Id.  Six years later, the court adopted the dissent from Julian, and thus the “single publication” 
rule, in Houston v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 155 S.W. 1068, 1070 (Mo. 1913).  “[B]ut one suit can 
be brought on the same libelous publication, no matter in how many places or at how many times 
it is published[.]”  Julian, 107 S.W. at 510 (Graves, J., dissenting).  After 1913, the entirety of the 
claim could be brought in either the county of publication or the county of the plaintiff’s 
residence.  Houston, 155 S.W. at 1070. 
 145. COLLINS, supra note 4, ¶ 30.16. 
 146. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (“California is the focal point both of the 
story and of the harm suffered.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000).  The six 
elements of defamation in Missouri are (1) publication (2) of a defamatory statement (3) that 
identifies the plaintiff (4) that is false (5) that is published with the requisite degree of fault and 
(6) damages the plaintiff’s reputation.  Id. 
 148. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (finding the defendant 
must purposefully direct his activities at the residents of the forum for jurisdiction to be proper). 
 149. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 397–98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 150. Id. at 397. 
 151. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 152. See id. 
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Missouri would choose to take this action.  States seek to protect the rights of 
their citizens and narrowing the targeting requirement would remove 
protections already in place.  Missouri is much more likely to expand the 
targeting test discussed in Baldwin than it is to narrow that test. 
D. Should Targeting Be Expanded? 
Dr. Michael Geist suggests that targeting is the “litmus test for Internet 
jurisdiction” and offers a three-factor test for increased consistency in 
determining jurisdiction: contracts, technology, and actual or implied 
knowledge.153  Dr. Geist notes that his test is not intended to find the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for a cause of action, but merely identifies whether the 
jurisdiction in question has been sufficiently targeted.154  The first factor, 
contracts, asks “whether either party has used a contractual arrangement to 
specify” the appropriate jurisdiction.155  Defamation, among other intentional 
torts, is unlikely to have a contractual arrangement as this factor is geared 
toward business-related Internet actions.156  The second factor, technology, 
examines whether jurisdictions are targeted or avoided based solely on the 
technology used.157  However, while Google and other sophisticated websites 
can limit where information is accessible using geographic mapping and 
identification technologies, many defendants, including those in Baldwin, do 
not have the ability or desire to restrict where the statement is read.158 
Therefore, the final factor, actual or implied knowledge, bears the full 
weight of Dr. Geist’s targeting analysis for Internet defamation cases.159  This 
factor would have courts assess the knowledge a defendant has (or should have 
had) about the geographic location of the online activity.160  Knowledge 
directly relates to Internet defamation cases as “defaming parties are or should 
be aware that the injury inflicted by their speech would be felt in the 
jurisdiction of their target.”161  The effect of this test in Internet defamation 
cases would be to subject a defendant to jurisdiction in the forum state not only 
 
 153. GEIST, supra note 49, at 107. 
 154. Id. at 108. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 108–12. 
 157. Id. at 112. 
 158. See GEIST, supra note 49, at 114–15.  As the Internet continues to evolve, the ability to 
restrict what information is accessible in various locations may become more commonplace.  At 
that time, this issue might need to be revisited.  For now, however, it is an issue more important 
in business cases than in defamation cases. 
 159. See id. at 116. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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when he “expressly aims” his defamatory statement there, but also when he 
should be aware that the statement will cause harm in the forum state.162 
If the court had followed this rule in Baldwin, the opinion may have 
instead warned “If you pick a fight, and you knew or should have known that 
fight was in Missouri, you can reasonably expect to settle it here.”  However, 
Dr. Geist’s three-factor test is clearly aimed to resolve jurisdictional issues for 
cases involving business conducted over the Internet.163  While it was not 
intended for use in Internet defamation cases, following Dr. Geist’s three-
factor test and expanding Calder to allow for implied knowledge of the forum 
state is an option available to Missouri courts. 
E. Legislative Solutions 
Professor Patrick Borchers suggests in a 2004 article that jurisdictional 
concerns in Internet libel cases might require legislative intervention.164  
Professor Borchers argues that courts’ reliance on the “express aiming” prong 
of Calder is misplaced, as is the courts’ refusal to distinguish (or even cite) 
Calder’s companion case of Keeton.165  One solution Professor Borchers offers 
is state legislative action; that is, the Missouri legislature could amend the 
long-arm statute to prevent Missouri courts from exercising jurisdiction over 
nonresident libel defendants.166  A less drastic solution, he suggests, is to 
amend the “single publication” rule so that a Missouri resident could only 
recover for damages suffered in Missouri, not damages suffered out of state.167  
To recover for nationwide damages, the plaintiff would need to sue in the 
defendant’s home forum.168  A third suggestion is to require courts to make a 
preliminary determination of the merits before deciding if jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant is proper.169 
State legislative action is unlikely, however.  The Missouri legislature 
would not voluntarily restrict its long-arm statute or the single publication rule 
as these actions would put Missouri residents at a disadvantage to residents of 
other states.170  The Missouri legislature has shown an interest in expanding 
 
 162. See id. 
 163. See Geist, supra note 49, at 117–18. 
 164. Borchers, supra note 48, at 490–92. 
 165. Id. at 485–88. 
 166. Id. at 490. 
 167. Id. at 491. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Borchers, supra note 48, at 491. 
 170. All fifty states plus the District of Columbia have a long-arm statute in some form.  
Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due 
Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 496 (2004).  California has perhaps the broadest, as it permits 
jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States.”  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2004). 
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court access to its residents, not restricting access.171  Professor Borchers 
mentions that Congress could also take these steps and apply a jurisdictional 
framework nationwide, and this approach may be more realistic considering 
the reluctance of states to reduce court access to their own citizens.172  If 
Congress created a nationwide jurisdictional framework for Internet 
defamation cases, Missouri residents would not be at a jurisdictional 
disadvantage because the residents of every state would be treated equally 
under a new national framework.173  While this Congressional solution may be 
the most effective and produce the most consistent judgments, it does not 
provide insight into how future Missouri courts will decide jurisdiction in 
Internet defamation cases. 
F. International Solutions 
Perhaps the simplest framework for Internet jurisdiction is the one used in 
the United Kingdom and Australia, among other countries.  There, the 
publication of defamatory material within the jurisdiction of the court subjects 
the defendant to that court.174  However, unlike many U.S. courts, which 
follow the single publication rule, material is considered “published” anywhere 
it is read, heard, or seen in the United Kingdom and Australia.175  The result, 
then, is that these courts can authorize service abroad whenever an offending 
publication is read, heard, or seen anywhere in the forum country.176  The only 
real limit to jurisdiction is discretion, as courts can refuse to hear a case 
because it is inconvenient for the parties.177 
An early Internet case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Missouri followed similar logic to find jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant.178  In Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., the court found that the 
defendant, simply by operating a website that could be accessed nationwide, 
was subject to jurisdiction in Missouri.179  Further, bringing the defendant into 
the court did not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
 
 171. See State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 891–92 (Mo. 1970) (“[The 
Missouri long-arm statute was] adopted by the legislature of this state . . . with the designed 
purpose of extending the jurisdiction of the courts of Missouri to [the limits of due process].”). 
 172. Borchers, supra note 48, at 492. 
 173. For example, Professor Borchers mentions the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act as an 
example of Congress limiting jurisdiction to further its own policy goals.  Id.  Under the Act, a 
state cannot modify another state’s child custody decree and is thus denied jurisdiction under the 
Act where they would otherwise be able to hear the case.  28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006). 
 174. COLLINS, supra note 4, ¶ 18.70–.71. 
 175. Id. ¶ 18.71. 
 176. Id. ¶ 26.26. 
 177. Id. ¶ 26.29. 
 178. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 179. Id. 
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justice because the defendant availed himself of Missouri through its online 
activity.180  While U.S. courts quickly moved away from this line of reasoning, 
Maritz has never been overruled.181 
Professor Borchers agrees, suggesting that the Zippo test should no longer 
be used in Internet libel cases and, following Keeton, concludes that “fifty-state 
jurisdiction is not necessarily unconstitutional in defamation cases.”182  The 
court in Baldwin was similarly unconcerned with the possibility that a 
defendant could be haled into the courts of any state.183  Quoting Professor C. 
Douglas Floyd and Shima Baradaran-Robison, the court noted that: 
[a] tortfeasor who mails a thousand bombs to recipients in one state, and one to 
recipients in each of the other forty-nine states, should not be relieved from 
geographic responsibility for the consequences of his actions in each of those 
states simply because he is subject to suit everywhere, or because his conduct 
has a uniquely intensive relationship with a single state.184 
As courts and scholars alike seem unconcerned with exposing an Internet 
defamation defendant to fifty-state jurisdiction, perhaps Missouri courts should 
revisit Maritz and re-introduce jurisdiction whenever the defamatory statement 
can be read, seen, or heard in Missouri.  The Missouri Supreme Court, 
however, may find it difficult to explain how fifty-state jurisdiction complies 
with the Due Process Clause.185  In the next section, the various approaches are 
evaluated against recent decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court in an attempt 
to predict Missouri’s future approach to personal jurisdiction in Internet 
defamation cases. 
III.  PREDICTING A MISSOURI SOLUTION 
The main issue for Missouri to decide is whether to create a completely 
new jurisdictional framework for Internet defamation cases, to use the same 
framework available to non-Internet defamation cases, or to slightly alter the 
existing framework.  A new framework is unlikely for Internet defamation 
cases, however. 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Maritz has not been overruled despite two thorough examinations by the Eastern District 
of Missouri, most recently in 2000 in Uncle Sam’s Safari Outfitters v. Uncle Sam’s Army Navy 
Outfitters-Manhattan, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 919, 924 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (distinguished on factual 
grounds). 
 182. Borchers, supra note 48, at 489–90. 
 183. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 184. Id. (quoting C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of 
Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and 
Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 659 (2006)). 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 99–109. 
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Zippo and other Internet tests may be relevant for determining minimum 
contacts for business torts, but when one person defames another, the means 
are not as important.  In Lakin v. Prudential Securities, Inc., the Eighth Circuit 
noted “it is possible for a Web site to be very interactive, but to have no 
quantity of contacts.”186  While this may be true for websites conducting 
business, defamation cases are different.187  Unlike business-related claims, 
where the Internet introduces a new medium for evaluating minimum contacts, 
defamation is an intentional tort.  The court must determine whether the 
defendant’s conduct was committed within the forum state, and this can be 
determined through the existing Calder effects test or another targeting test.  
Therefore, Zippo should not impact future defamation cases because the level 
of interactivity is not as relevant in defamation cases as it is in business 
contacts cases.188  Additionally, as all websites become more interactive, the 
idea of a “passive” website is quickly disappearing.189  Perhaps the Southern 
District was wise in reiterating that it did not seek to “tease out any universal 
rule about personal jurisdiction in internet [sic] cases.”190  Indeed, what works 
for Internet business contract cases does not work for Internet defamation 
cases.  Missouri is unlikely to use the Zippo test or to adopt any new 
framework to determine future Internet defamation cases. 
Missouri will likely keep the existing framework for defamation cases and 
apply it to Internet defamation cases or slightly alter that existing framework to 
account for the advances in technology.  In enacting its long-arm statute, the 
Missouri legislature intended “to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state over nonresident defendants to that extent permissible under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States.”191  Therefore, Missouri courts should look to bring any nonresident 
defendant into the state when that defendant has purposefully availed him or 
herself of the laws of Missouri, including when a nonresident defendant has 
deliberately committed some defamatory act that impacts a Missouri 
resident.192  Missouri will need to determine the extent to which Calder or 
another targeting test allows its courts to hale nonresident defendants into the 
state. 
 
 186. Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 187. Compare Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088–89 
(E.D. Mo. 2001) (website in Nevada allowing Missouri residents to make hotel reservations in 
Nevada did not establish minimum contacts in Missouri), with Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 
693, 697, 707 (7th Cir. 2010) (websites in Colorado, Michigan, and Ohio which contained 
defamatory statements about Illinois resident sufficient to establish minimum contacts in Illinois). 
 188. Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703 n.7. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 49–51. 
 190. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 191. State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. 1970). 
 192. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985). 
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Other state courts are also looking to bring in all nonresident defendants 
that they can without violating due process.193  The Missouri Supreme Court, 
then, could look to those courts to see just how far due process can bend before 
breaking.194  This approach would increase the protections available to 
Missouri residents, but Missouri courts likely would balk at the idea of bending 
due process until it breaks. 
Instead, Missouri would be wise to simply take the Southern District’s 
decision in Baldwin and explicitly adopt it as the jurisdictional framework for 
Internet defamation cases.195  Specifically, if a nonresident defendant uses the 
Internet to purposefully target the resident plaintiff, with the goal of harming 
the plaintiff’s reputation, that nonresident defendant should be haled into the 
courts of the state.196  While this solution does not forge new ground or deviate 
sharply from established case law, it is the responsible approach. 
The Internet evolves even faster than the law, so if Missouri tries to create 
a jurisdictional framework to deal specifically with Internet defamation cases, 
it likely will not have any lasting impact.197  As the Internet grows, the number 
of Internet defamation cases will grow with it.198  Perhaps the Internet will 
evolve to the point where specific rules for defamation over the Internet are 
 
 193. See supra notes 170–173. 
 194. For example, Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996), has yet 
to be overruled.  It is one of the broadest interpretations of due process in a jurisdictional context 
since the nonresident’s maintenance of a website established a reasonable anticipation that the 
website could be accessed by residents of Missouri (or elsewhere in the world).  Id. at 1334.  
Therefore, personal jurisdiction was held proper under due process.  Id. 
 195. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 396–98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 196. Id. 
 197. The Internet has grown so quickly that 2011 marks the year “the internet [sic] has run 
out of room.”  Dylan Tweeney, No Easy Fixes as Internet Runs Out of Addresses, WIRED.COM 
(Feb. 3, 2011, 9:58 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/02/internet-addresses/.  While 
the old system of Internet addresses, called IPv4, has expired, the new system, IPv6, has enough 
web addresses so that every person on Earth could have 5x1028 (5 followed by 28 zeroes) 
addresses.  Id. 
 198. The “MySpace trial,” discussed supra note 8, made national news, but many other 
Internet defamation cases are now appearing before the courts.  In January 2011, a Georgia jury 
awarded over $400,000 to a man who lost his job due to libelous allegations of drug use and 
pedophilia that appeared online after his fiancée was murdered by her ex-husband.  Rhonda Cook, 
Ga. Man Awarded $404,000 for Libelous Internet Postings, AJC.COM (Jan. 20, 2011, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/ga-man-awarded-404-809868.html.  While no lawsuit has been filed as 
of the writing of this Note, Missouri State Representative Donna Lichtenegger was among four 
Missouri lawmakers who experienced first-hand the effects of Internet defamation as her 
Facebook page was hacked to indicate that gifts from lobbyists was her favorite job perk.  Scott 
Moyers, Four Legislators’ Facebook Pages Hacked, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN, Feb. 8, 2011, at 
1A. 
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needed.199  For now, however, defamation by magazine,200 newspaper,201 and 
Internet all involve the same jurisdictional problems.202 
If Missouri wants to update the defamation jurisdictional framework for 
Internet-based cases, it can clarify the Calder test for those cases.  One useful 
change would be adding Dr. Geist’s thoughts on implied knowledge of the 
forum state.203  A defendant would be haled into the state as long as he should 
have known harm would be felt in the state, even if he lacked actual 
knowledge.204 
Another consideration would be integrating aspects of Professor Sanders’ 
ideas on community.205  By combining Professor Sanders’s ideas with Dr. 
Geist’s thoughts on implied knowledge, Missouri could ask whether a 
nonresident defendant knew or should have known the real-world 
jurisdiction(s) where the targeted community is located.  For example, the 
defendants in Baldwin knew or should have known that the dog breeding 
community (the community where the plaintiff’s reputation would be harmed) 
was located, in part, in Missouri.206  By defaming a member of that 
community, Missouri could argue the defendants purposefully availed 
themselves of Missouri’s laws, giving them the minimum contacts required to 
satisfy due process.  Whether the Missouri Supreme Court takes these or 
similar steps is yet to be seen, but the framework adopted by the Southern 
District in Baldwin provides a strong starting point for Internet defamation 
cases in Missouri. 
STEPHEN W. BOSKY 
 
 199. For example, with the expansion of mobile web technology, jurisdictional issues have 
the potential to become even more complicated.  In an over-the-top example, consider which 
state(s) would be able to assert jurisdiction over a Florida defendant, posting a defamatory 
statement about a Missouri resident, on California-based Facebook.com, on the Facebook wall of 
an Illinois resident, with a phone by Washington-based T-Mobile USA, while driving across state 
lines from Georgia to Tennessee.  Under Baldwin, Missouri would likely be able to hale the 
defendant into its courts as long as the defendant knew the plaintiff was a Missouri resident.  
Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 397–98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 200. E.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984). 
 201. E.g., Hugel v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 202. In fact, the United States Supreme Court is reluctant to “grant special procedural 
protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional 
protections embodied in the substantive laws.”  Calder, 465 U.S. at 790–91. 
 203. See supra Part II.D. 
 204. See supra Part II.D. 
 205. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 206. See Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
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